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Abstract
The non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) and millimeter-wave (mmWave) transmission enable
the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assisted wireless networks to provide broadband connectivity over
densely packed urban areas. The presence of malicious receivers, however, compromise the security of
the UAV-to-ground communications link, thereby degrading secrecy rates. In this work, we consider
a NOMA-based transmission strategy in a mmWave UAV-assisted wireless network, and investigate
the respective secrecy-rate performance rigorously. In particular, we propose a protected-zone approach
to enhance the secrecy-rate performance by preventing the most vulnerable subregion (outside the
user region) from the presence of malicious receivers. The respective secrecy rates are then derived
analytically as a function of the protected zone, which verifies great secrecy rate improvements through
optimizing shape of the protected zone in use. Furthermore, we show that the optimal protected
zone shape for mmWave links appears as a compromise between protecting the angle versus distance
dimension, which would otherwise form to protect solely the distance dimension for sub-6GHz links.
We also numerically evaluate the impact of transmission power, protected-zone size, and UAV altitude
on the secrecy-rate performance improvements as practical considerations.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The recent years have witnessed tremendous increase in mobile data traffic, which is estimated
to reach 77.5 exabytes per month by 2022 with a 46% growth rate. Moreover, the number of
mobile devices is predicted to exceed 12.3 billion by 2022 with more than 422 million being
5G capable [1]. Towards supporting this enormous amount of data traffic and mobile users,
the non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) and millimeter-wave (mmWave) communications
are envisioned as two key technology for the next-generation cellular networks [2]. In addition,
integrating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) into the existing terrestrial wireless networks is yet
another powerful direction to seamlessly provide broadband connectivity over densely packed
urban environments [3]. Along with the standardization efforts for 5G and beyond, this particular
research direction connecting mmWave NOMA transmission and air-to-ground UAV links have
been studied extensively in the literature from various perspectives over the past several years.
The confidentiality of the communications messages is yet another important challenge for the
next-generation cellular networks. In general, the presence of illegitimate malicious receivers (i.e.,
eavesdroppers, or, in short, Eves) compromise the security of the information exchange between
the transmit and receive ends. The physical layer security (PLS) has emerged as an effective
solution to such privacy concerns in wireless connections [4]. The protected zone and artificial
noise are two well-known PLS technique in the literature. The goal of both techniques is to
degrade the communications links between the transmitter and Eves either through preventing
the presence of Eves in specified regions (i.e., protected zone) [5]–[7], or by intentionally putting
noise towards Eves (i.e., artificial noise) [8]. The protected zone requires additional measures to
be taken on the ground (to clear the specified zone from the presence of Eves) while the artifical
noise techniques are taken care of at the transmitter through special beamforming strategies.
There are limited number of works in the literature considering PLS for UAV-assisted com-
munications in mmWave frequencies. In particular, [9] considers a mmWave communications
scenario involving an energy-constrained Internet-of-Things (IoT) receiver along with UAVs
acting as relay. The respective secrecy rates are enhanced through optimizing the power allocation
scheme and UAV location. In [10], the authors consider a similar communications setting where
the impact of small-scale fading is also considered during the secrecy-rate optimization. In a
very recent work, the authors incorporate NOMA into the PLS problem considered by [9] and
[10] with UAV links and mmWave transmission, which aims at evaluating the performance of
3a transceiver based on simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT). None of
these works, however, consider the PLS techniques mentioned above (i.e., protected zone and
artificial noise) to evaluate the respective secrecy-rate performance improvement [11].
In this work, which is an extended version of [12], we investigate the secrecy-rate performance
of a UAV-assisted wireless communications scenario in mmWave frequency bands. In particular,
we consider the NOMA transmission to improve the spectral efficiency through serving multiple
legitimate users at a time. The degradation in the secrecy rates due to the presence of sur-
rounding Eves is mitigated through the formation of protected zone on the ground. The specific
contributions of our work can be summarized as follows:
— We develop a complete framework where the secrecy-rate performance of the NOMA-based
hybrid transmission scheme is rigorously investigated as a function of the shape and size
of the protected zone. The respective outage and rate expressions are derived analytically,
which show a very good match with the simulation data under various operation altitude
and transmit power values, and verify the superior performance as compared to OMA.
— We rigorously investigate the impact of decoding capability at Eves on the secrecy-rate
performance through best-case (no multiuser decoding) and worst-case (equivalent mul-
tiuser decoding capability as legitimate users) conditions. We show that the upper bound
provided by the best-case condition becomes very tight in the high transmit-power regime
(by approaching to that of worst-case condition) regardless of the particular power allocation.
— We also consider the impact of the particular Eve region sizes (in comparison to the protected
zone area) on the secrecy-rate performance being space- versus shape-limited. We show that
the performance is limited by the available space (i.e., space-limited) for small Eve regions
or large protected zones. In contrast, the specific shape of the protected zone dominates the
secrecy-rate performance (i.e., shape-limited) as a compromise between protecting angle-
versus distance-dimension, thanks to the mmWave propagation characteristics.
— The minimum transmit power and size of the protected zone to achieve specific secrecy-rate
performance are also investigated to keep the required ground and spectral resources as small
as possible. The multiuser decoding capability at Eves and operation altitude are individually
taken into consideration while evaluating the respective impact on these minimum values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model under
consideration. The NOMA transmission and secrecy rates are investigated in Section III with
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Fig. 1. System scenario where the NOMA transmission serves multiple users simultaneously in the presence of Eves.
the respective outage and rate derivation in Section IV. The numerical results are provided in
Section V, and the paper concludes with some remarks in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first present the system model along with the mmWave channel and user
distributions, and then describe the protected zone approach aiming at improving secrecy rates.
A. Overview
We consider a NOMA transmission scenario where a single UAV base station (UAV-BS)
equipped with an M element antenna array is serving single-antenna users in mmWave downlink
communications. We assume that all the users lie inside a specific user region as shown in
Fig. 1. A 3-dimensional (3D) beam is generated by the UAV-BS which entirely covers the user
region. We assume that there are K users in total, and the users are represented by the set
NU = {1, 2, . . . K}. The user region is specified by the inner radius Li, outer radius Lu, and
angle ∆u, which is half of the fixed angle within the projection of horizontal propagation pattern
5of the UAV-BS on the xy–plane. Note that it is possible to reasonably model various different
hot spot scenarios such as a stadium, concert hall, traffic jam, and urban canyon by modifying
these control parameters.
We assume that although the user region is free from Eves, the surrounding region does
include Eves trying to intercept the transmission between the UAV-BS and legitimate users. We
specify a bounded region around the user region, referred to as Eve region, which is assumed
to include all the Eves. Similar to the user region, we identify the Eve region by the inner
radius Li (same as the user region), outer radius Le (such that Le≥Lu), and angle ∆e (such that
∆e≥∆u), as shown in Fig. 1. We assume Ke Eves in total, which are represented by the set
NE = {1, 2, . . . Ke}. Note that horizontal footprint of the UAV-BS beam pattern covers the Eve
region (so that any Eve has nonzero channel to the UAV-BS), as well, but the coverage over
Eve region might be provided by the side lobes depending on the specific radiation pattern.
Note that although we formulate the overall problem through a fixed and bounded Eve region,
we present numerical results in Section V for various sizes of Eve region. To this end, we express
the outer radius and angle of the Eve region in terms of the user region parameters as Le =κLu
and ∆e =κ∆u, respectively, where κ is referred to as expansion ratio. In particular, we consider
large enough κ values to investigate the impact of the relative Eve region size on the overall
secrecy rates and the design of protected zone.
B. Location Distribution and mmWave Channel Model
We assume that users and Eves are uniformly distributed within the user and Eve region,
respectively, following homogeneous Poisson point process (HPPP) with the densities λu and
λe, respectively. The number of users and Eves are therefore Poisson distributed such that
Pr(k users in the user region) =µku e
−µu/k! and Pr(k Eves in the Eve region) =µkee
−µe/k! with
the mean densities µu =Auλu and µe =Aeλe, where area of the user and Eve regions are given
as Au = (L2u−L2i ) ∆u and Ae = (L2e −L2i ) ∆e−Au, respectively.
We assume that all the users have line-of-sight (LoS) paths since LoS path is much stronger
than the non-LoS (NLoS) paths in mmWave frequencies [13]. The channel between the k-th
user and UAV-BS is therefore given as
hk =
√
M
αk a(θk)[
PL
(√
d2k + h
2
)]1/2 , (1)
6where h, dk, αk and θk represent the UAV-BS altitude, horizontal distance between the k-th user
and UAV-BS, small-scale fading gain being standard complex Gaussian, and angle-of-departure
(AoD), respectively. In addition, PL (x) in (1) represents the path loss (PL) over the LoS distance
x, and a(θk) is the steering vector associated with θk, for which the m-th element is given as[
a(θk)
]
m
=
1√
M
exp
{
−j2pi ds
λc
(m−1) cos (θk)
}
, (2)
for m= 1, . . . ,M , where ds is the antenna element spacing of uniform linear array (ULA) under
consideration, and λc is the wavelength of the carrier frequency. Note that channel of any Eve
in the Eve region and UAV-BS can also be described by (1) using the appropriate parameters
for the Eves (i.e., horizontal distance, small-scale fading, and AoD).
C. Protected Zone Approach
The overall transmission scheme between the UAV-BS and legitimate users is highly prone to
the Eve attacks, and the PLS is accordingly compromised. In this study, we consider protected
zone approach as an attempt to enhance the secrecy rates [5], [14]. In the proposed approach, an
additional area, referred to as protected zone, around the user region (and inside the Eve region)
has been perfectly cleared from Eves by taking necessary physical measures on the ground. Since
ensuring no Eves within the protected zone requires certain resources being spent on the ground,
our goal is to keep the area of this protected zone as small as possible. We show in Section III
that the secrecy rates can be further improved by optimizing the shape of the protected zone by
taking into account the propagation characteristics of the mmWave transmission.
The protected zone can indeed be described by an angle-distance (radius) pair (∆p, Lp) such
that ∆p≤∆e and Li≤Lp≤Le, as shown in Fig. 2. This protected area is actually a fraction of
the complete Eve region, and we denote this area fraction by q=AP/Ae≤ 1, where AP is the
area of the protected region given as
AP =

(
L2p−L2u
)
∆p, if Lu ≤ Lp ≤ Le,∆p ≤ ∆u , (3a)(
L2p−L2i
)
(∆p −∆u) , if Li ≤ Lp ≤ Lu,∆u ≤ ∆p ≤ ∆e , (3b)(
L2p−L2i
)
∆p − Au, if Lu ≤ Lp ≤ Le,∆u ≤ ∆p ≤ ∆e . (3c)
The protected zone can take different shapes for a fixed q value, as sketched in Fig. 2. In
particular, we refer to the protected zones satisfying (3a), (3b), and (3c) as Type-I, Type-II, and
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Fig. 2. Footprint of the user and Eve regions explicitly showing protected zone represented by angle-distance pair (∆p, Lp)
with example layouts for Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III.
Type-III, respectively, as shown in Fig. 2. Note that whenever we have ∆p≤∆u, Lp should be
sufficiently greater than Lu to have a nonzero protected zone (i.e. Type-I). On the other hand,
when we have ∆u≤∆p≤∆e, Lp might be smaller (i.e., Type-II) or greater (i.e., Type-III) than
Lu depending on the area of the user region and particular q choice.
Considering the algebraic definition of the different protected zone types in (3a)-(3c), we can
express Lp parametrically through geometrical relations in Fig. 2 as follows
Lp =

[
L2u +
qAe
∆p
] 1
2
, if Type-I,[
L2i +
qAe
∆p −∆u
] 1
2
, if Type-II,[
L2i +
qAe + Au
∆p
] 1
2
, if Type-III,
(4)
with the minimum value it can effectively take in each protected zone type given as
Lminp =

[
(1 + q (κ3 − 1))L2u − q (κ− 1)L2i
] 1
2
, if Type-I,[
q (1 + κ+ κ2)L2u + (1− q)L2i
] 1
2
, if Type-II,
κ−
1
2
[
(1 + q (κ3 − 1))L2u + (1− q) (κ− 1)L2i
] 1
2
, if Type-III.
(5)
Note that depending on the expansion ratio κ, the minimum value that Lp can take (while meeting
the area fraction q) is limited by the maximum angular width of the particular protected zone
types (i.e., ∆u for Type-I, and κ∆u for Type-II and Type-III). In a similar fashion, the minimum
8value that ∆p can effectively take is limited by the maximum range (distance) of the protected
zone given, which is given for each protected zone type as follows
∆minp =

q
(κ+ 1)L2u
[ (
1 + κ+ κ2
)
L2u − L2i
]
∆u, if Type-I,[
1 + q
(κ3 − 1)L2u − (κ− 1)L2i
L2u − L2i
]
∆u, if Type-II,[
1 + q
(κ3 − 1 + (1− κ2) /q)L2u − (κ− 1)L2i
κ2L2u − L2i
]
∆u, if Type-III.
(6)
III. SECURE NOMA FOR UAV-BS DOWNLINK
In this section, we consider the NOMA transmission in mmWave downlink between the UAV-
BS and legitimate users, and evaluate the secrecy rates along with the protected zone optimization.
A. Transmission to Legitimate Users
We assume that the desired legitimate users to be involved in the NOMA transmission are
represented by the set NN such that NN⊂NU, and are indexed from the best to the worst with
respect to their effective channel gains (to be defined specifically in the following). We define
βk as the power allocation coefficient for the k-th user such that
∑
i∈NN β
2
i = 1. In order to yield
a sufficient decoding performance, we assume that the NOMA users are allocated adequate
power levels that are inversely proportional to channel qualities such that βi<βj for ∀ i < j with
i, j ∈NN. The transmitted signal is therefore generated by superposition coding as follows
x =
√
Ptxw
∑
i∈NN
βisi, (7)
where Ptx and sk are the total downlink transmit power and k-th user’s message, respectively,
and w is the beamforming vector of the UAV-BS such that its projection on the xy–plane is in
the direction of an azimuth angle θ∈ [0, 2pi]. The received signal at the k-th user is given by
yk = hHk x + vk =
√
PtxhHkw
∑
i∈NN
βisi + vk, (8)
where vk is zero-mean complex Gaussian additive white noise with variance N0.
After receiving the signal in (8), the k-th user first decodes messages of all weaker users
(i.e., all m-th users such that m>k) sequentially in the presence of all the relatively stronger
users’ messages (i.e., those allocated less power). The decoded messages are then subtracted
9from the received signal of (8) in sequence, and the k-th user decodes its own message treating
the stronger users’ messages as noise (i.e., all m-th users’ messages with m<k) . This overall
decoding process is referred to as successive interference cancellation (SIC). Assuming that all
the interfering messages of the users weaker than the m-th user are decoded and subtracted
perfectly at the k-th user, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) while decoding the
m-th user message (at the k-th user) is given for m≥ k as
SINRUm→k =
Ptx|hHkw|2β2m∑
l<m, l∈NN
Ptx|hHkw|2β2l +N0
, (9)
which yields SINRUk→k =Ptx|hHkw|2β2k/N0 when m= k represents the index of the strongest user.
Note that the term |hHkw|2 is sufficiently characterize the SINR in (9), which involves the
contribution of not only the individual user channels, but also the precoding vector, and is referred
to as effective channel gain. Assuming critically spaced ULA (i.e., ds =λc/2), the effective
channel gain for the k-th legitimate user is given using (1) as follows [13]
|hHkw|2 ≈
|αk|2
M × PL
(√
d2k + h
2
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
sin
(
piM(θ−θk)
2
)
sin
(
pi(θ−θk)
2
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
|αk|2
PL
(√
d2k + h
2
)FM (θ, θk) , (10)
where FM(·) is called Feje´r kernel function.
B. Decoding Performance at Eves
The decoding performance of the superposition-coded signal in (7) at the most detrimental Eve
(i.e., the one with the largest effective channel) depends on the presumed decoding capability
of the Eves. In [15]–[18], it is assumed that the (most detrimental) Eve has already decoded the
relatively weaker users’ messages while decoding a specific user message by SIC. This approach
implicitly assumes that the Eve has the knowledge of decoding order and power allocation for
the legitimate users, which clearly overestimates the Eve capability. This approach is therefore
referred to as the worst-case condition (from the legitimate user’s point of view), and is widely
adopted in the literature to obtain a conservative (lower) bound for the secrecy rates.
It is, however, assumed in [19], [20] that the most detrimental Eve does not apply SIC (because
it may not have either decoding order or power allocation information for the legitimate NOMA
users). The Eve rather treats all the other interfering legitimate NOMA user messages as noise
(irrespective of belonging to weaker or stronger users) while decoding any of them. This approach
seemingly does not assume any multiuser decoding capability at the Eve, and is referred to as
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the best-case scenario (from the legitimate user’s point of view), or upper bound on the secrecy
performance [21].
Remark 1: Note that a theoretical lower bound is also considered in [21] for the secrecy-rate
performance, which assumes that each legitimate user’s message is detected at the Eve under
the observation noise only (without any multiuser interference). This assumption leads only to
theoretical performance bounds for the secrecy rates. Assuming that the decoding order and
power allocation information is available to the most detrimental Eve, the respective decoding
performance (at the most detrimental Eve) is somewhere between the worst- and best-case
scenarios defined above. The actual decoding performance basically depends on the detection
accuracy of the relatively weaker user’s messages at the most detrimental Eve. Note also that as
the most detrimental Eve decodes the weaker users’ message erroneously, this will in turn appear
as an additional interference for the subsequent detection iterations through error propagation,
which will eventually improve the overall secrecy rates at the legitimate users.
Assuming gE as the effective channel gain of the most detrimental Eve, and replacing it with
|hHkw|2 in (9), the SINR for the worst-case scenario while decoding the m-th user message at
the most detrimental Eve is given by
SINREm =
PtxgEβ
2
m∑
l<m, l∈NN
PtxgEβ2l +N0
, (11)
while that for the best-case scenario is
SINREm =
Ptx gEβ
2
m∑
l 6=m, l∈NN
Ptx gEβ2l +N0
. (12)
As for the channel description in (1), the effective channel gain of any Eve can be represented
by (10) employing the appropriate channel parameters for the Eves (i.e., horizontal distance,
small-scale fading, and AoD). We accordingly describe the effective channel gain of the most
detrimental Eve as follows
gE = max
k∈NE
|gHkw|2 (13)
where gk is the channel gain of the k-th Eve. Note also that we assume that the UAV-BS has
no channel state information (CSI) for the Eves while it has sufficient level of information on
the channel qualities of the legitimate users (to be able to apply NOMA).
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C. Sum Secrecy Rates
The SIC approach requires that message of any legitimate user should be decoded not only at
its own user but also at every other legitimate user which has relatively better channel condition.
Assuming that Rk→m = log(1 + SINRUk→m) represents the instantaneous rate associated with
the decoding of the k-th user’s message at the m-th user, the achievable rate for the k-th user
message is given as
RNOMAk = min
{
Rk→m
∣∣m ≤ k, ∀m ∈ NN}. (14)
Considering (9), we observe that SINRUk→m≥ SINRUk→n for any m,n∈NN with m≤n since
|hHmw|2≥ |hHnw|2 by definition, and (14) accordingly yields
RNOMAk = log
(
1 + SINRUk→k
)
. (15)
The achievable rate for decoding the k-th user message at the most detrimental Eve is
RNOMAk,E = log
(
1 + SINREk
)
, (16)
which applies to both the worst- and best-case conditions regarding the Eve’s decoding capability
with the adequate SINR expression of either (11) or (12). Note that the assumption of having
already decoded the weaker user’s messages in the worst-case condition eliminates any necessity
to consider other SINR terms (corresponding to the weaker users messages) in (16). The secrecy
rate for the k-th legitimate user is therefore given as follows
RNOMAk,SEC =
[
RNOMAk − RNOMAk,E
]+
, (17)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. As (17) implies, the secrecy rates are always strictly positive.
Assuming that Rk denotes the target secrecy rate for the k-th legitimate user, we define the
respective conditional secrecy outage probability as follows
Pok|K,Ke = Pr
(
RNOMAk,SEC < Rk | K ∈ SN, Ke ≥ 1
)
, (18)
where SN is the set of number of legitimate users for which NOMA is possible. Note that there
should be at least KNmin legitimate users to make NOMA possible such that K
N
min≥ argmaxk{k|k ∈
NN}, and we therefore have SN = {k | k≥KNmin, k∈Z+}. The outage-based sum secrecy rate for
NOMA is then given as
RNOMASEC =
∞∑
n∈SN
∞∑
m=1
Pr (K = n)Pr (Ke = m)
( ∑
k∈NN
(
1− Pok|K,Ke
)
Rk
)
, (19)
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which assumes the presence of at least one Eve in the Eve region. When we have K<KNmin,
the NOMA transmission is not possible any more, and we resort to single user transmission
(SUT) where the legitimate user with the best channel quality (among the ones in NN) is
scheduled during the whole course of transmission. Note that the number of legitimate users
should satisfy KSmin≤K ≤KNmin for SUT such that KSmin = argmink{k|k ∈NN} is the minimum
number of legitimate users for SUT. Assuming SS = {k |KSmin≤ k≤KNmin, k∈Z+}, the respective
SUT secrecy rate is given as
RSUTSEC =
∞∑
n∈SS
∞∑
m=1
Pr (K = n)Pr (Ke = m)
(
1− Pok|K,Ke
)
Rk, (20)
where k is the index of the scheduled legitimate user, and
Pok|K,Ke = Pr
([
RSUTk − RSUTk,E
]+
< Rk | K ∈ SS, Ke ≥ 1
)
, (21)
with RSUTk = log
(
1 +Ptx|hHkw|2/N0
)
and RSUTk,E = log (1 +Ptx gE/N0). The final sum secrecy rate
is then given by (19) and (20) as follows
RSEC =R
NOMA
SEC +R
SUT
SEC . (22)
D. Shape Optimization for Protected Zone
In this section, we discuss optimization of the protected zone shape to enhance the secrecy
rates while keeping its area the same. Considering the definition of the protected zone area in
(3a)-(3c), it is obvious that more than one (∆p, Lp) pairs produce the same area fraction q, and,
hence, end up requiring the same ground resources. We also note that any particular subregion
(i.e., candidate for the protected zone) within the Eve region does not impair the secrecy rates
equally even if the areas of these subregions are the same and the Eves are equally capable.
This is due to the effective channel gain between the UAV-BS and Eves which has particular
values in each subregion, and, hence, is a function of the Eves’ location.
Thanks to the directional propagation feature of the mmWave links, the effective channel gain
of the Eves is a function of not only the distance but also the relative angle (i.e., angle offset
from the beamforming direction) associated with each Eve. As a result, Eves with better effective
channel gain, or equivalently being in specific subregions (i.e., distance-angle pairs) impair the
secrecy rates more. Indeed, the subregion involving the most detrimental Eve has the largest
impact on the secrecy rates. Hence, instead of choosing the subregions arbitrarily to form the
13
protected zone, it is reasonable to include (i.e., protect) subregions which yield better effective
channel gain for Eves, and hence are likely to involve the most detrimental Eve.
We therefore consider to optimize the shape of the protected zone, or equivalently find the
optimal (∆p, Lp) pair, to enhance secrecy rates while keeping its area the same. At a particular
UAV-BS altitude and for a given area fraction q, the optimal shape is given as
max
∆p, Lp
RSEC (23)
s.t. (∆p, Lp) satisfies (3a)-(3c), (23a)
where RSEC is the sum secrecy rate defined in (22).
Remark 2: Note that the impact of the optimization of protected zone shape depends on
the particular values of the area fraction q ∈ (0, 1) and expansion ratio κ> 1. For large q or
small κ values, there is not enough degrees of freedom to alter the shape of the protected
zone as the respective area can only be constructed for a limited range of (∆p, Lp) values.
The corresponding secrecy-rate performance is mostly dominated by the available size of the
Eve region into which the protected zone is inserted, and is therefore referred to as space-
limited. On the other hand, as we have smaller q or larger κ, we start ending up with some
optimal values for the (∆p, Lp) pairs which maximize the secrecy rates while not appearing
at the corresponding boundaries (as specified in (3a)-(3c) for different protected zone types).
The respective secrecy-rate performance is mostly dominated by the shape of the protected zone
(along with the propagation characteristics), and hence is referred to as shape-limited.
IV. SECRECY SUM RATES FOR HYBRID NOMA/SUT
In this section, we derive analytical expression for the secrecy sum rates of the hybrid
NOMA/SUT transmission scheme described in Section III. Without any loss of generality, we
consider two NOMA users though the results can be generalized to multiple NOMA users.
A. Outage Probability
We assume that the NOMA transmission targets i-th and j-th users with i > j, which are there-
fore designated as the weaker and stronger users, respectively. In accordance with the discussion
in Section III-C, we have KNmin = i and K
S
min = j for this particular case, and the number of
legitimate users K should be in the sets SN = {k | k≥ i, k∈Z+} and SS = {k | j≤ k < i, k∈Z+}
14
for the NOMA and SUT schemes, respectively. In addition, the SUT scheme schedules the j-th
user whenever i-th user is not present.
The conditional secrecy outage probability in (18) for NOMA can be elaborated as follows
Pok|K,Ke = Pr
([
RNOMAk − RNOMAk,E
]+
< Rk | Φ
)
, (24)
= Pr
(
0 < Rk,R
NOMA
k < R
NOMA
k,E | Φ
)
+ Pr
{
RNOMAk − RNOMAk,E < Rk,RNOMAk > RNOMAk,E | Φ
}
, (25)
where Φ stands for the given condition {K ∈ SN, Ke ≥ 1} in (18). After further simplification,
and noting that Rk takes always positive values, (25) turns out to be
Pok|Φ = Pr
(
RNOMAk < R
NOMA
k,E | Φ
)
+ Pr
(
RNOMAk,E < R
NOMA
k < R
NOMA
k,E + Rk | Φ
)
, (26)
= Pr
(
RNOMAk < R
NOMA
k,E + Rk | Φ
)
, (27)
which will be evaluated in the following to derive the analytical secrecy outage probabilities
for the NOMA scheme considering the worst- and best-case conditions regarding the decoding
capability of Eves.
The conditional outage secrecy probability for the SUT scheme in (21) can be elaborated
following a similar strategy, and is given as follows
Pok|Φ = Pr
(
RSUTk < R
SUT
k,E + Rk | Φ
)
, (28)
where Φ stands for the respective given condition {K ∈ SS, Ke ≥ 1}. Since we have single
user in the SUT scheme scheduled all the time, there is no worst- or best-case conditions for
decoding at the most detrimental Eve.
Theorem 1: The conditional secrecy outage probability of the strong NOMA user in (27), and
that of the SUT user in (28) are given analytically as follows
Poj|Φ =
∫ ∞
0
∫ δmaxj (y)
0
fγj |Φ(x) fgE|Φ(y) dx dy, (29)
where γj = |hHj w|2 is the effective channel gain for the j-th legitimate user, fγj |Φ(x) and fgE|Φ(y)
are the PDF of the effective channel gain for the j-th legitimate user and most detrimental Eve,
respectively, and the inner integration upper limit for the NOMA transmission is given as
δmaxj (y) =

2Rj−1
Ptx
N0
β2j
+2Rjy, worst-case condition, (30a)
2Rj−1
Ptx
N0
β2j
+ 2Rj
y
1 + Ptx
N0
yβ2i
, best-case condition, (30b)
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and δmaxj (y) =
2Rj−1
Ptx
N0
+2Rjy for SUT.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 3: As the transmit power becomes sufficiently large, the outage performance of the
strong NOMA user for the best-case condition (where the most detrimental Eve has no multiuser
decoding capability at all) approaches to that of the worst-case condition (which assumes that
the Eve has already decoded the weak user message before decoding the strong user message).
In other words, δmaxj → 2Rjy as Ptx→∞ irrespective of the Eve decoding capability being worst
or best. As a result, the theoretical upper bound provided by the best-case scenario becomes
very tight in high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime (by approaching to the worst-case scenario)
regardless of the particular power allocation (i.e., βj value) choice. Note also that the integration
upper limit δmaxj (y) for SUT can be obtained by assuming βj = 0 and βj = 1 in either (30a) or
(30b), which aligns with the fact that the SUT scheme allocates all the resources to a single user
(i.e., strong NOMA user) all the time.
Theorem 2: The conditional secrecy outage probability of the weak NOMA user in (27) is
given analytically as follows
Poi|Φ =
∫ %
0
∫ δi(y)
0
fγk|Φ(x) fgE|Φ(y) dx dy +
∫ ∞
%
∫ ∞
δi(y)
fγk|Φ(x) fgE|Φ(y) dx dy, (31)
where γi = |hHi w|2 is the effective channel gain for the i-th legitimate user, fγi|Φ(x) is the PDF
of the effective channel gain for the i-th legitimate user, and the integration limits are
δi(y) =
2Ri(1 + Ptx
N0
y)− (1 + Ptx
N0
β2j y)
Ptx
N0
(
(1 + Ptx
N0
β2j y)− 2Riβ2j (1 + PtxN0 y)
) (32)
% =
1− 2Riβ2j
Ptx
N0
β2j
. (33)
Proof: See Appendix B.
B. Distribution of Ordered Effective Channel Gain
In order to compute the outage secrecy probabilities in (29) and (31), we need the ordered
PDF of the effective channel gain not only for the i-th and j-th legitimate users but also for the
most detrimental Eve. By order statistics, the PDF of the effective channel gain for the k-th user
with k ∈{i, j} can be expressed in terms of unordered distribution as follows [22]
f|hHk w|2|Φ(z) = ck
dFU(z)
dz
(FU(z))
K−k (1− FU(z))k−1 , (34)
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where FU(z) is the CDF of unordered effective channel gain for any legitimate user with the
given condition Φ, and ck = K!(k−1)!(K−k)! . The PDF of the effective channel gain for the most
detrimental Eve can also be given in a similar way as follows
fgE|Φ(y) = Ke
dFE(y)
dy
(FE(y))
Ke−1 , (35)
where FE(z) is the CDF of the unordered effective channel gain for any Eve. In the following,
we provide the CDF of the unordered effective channel gain for the legitimate users, and derive
that for the most detrimental Eve.
Corollary 1: The CDF of the unordered effective channel gain of any legitimate user for the
scenario presented in Section II is given as
FU(z)=
∫ θ+∆u
θ−∆u
∫ Lu
Li
(
1−e
(
−zPL
(√
r2+h2
)
FM (θ,θk)
))
r
Au
dr dθ, (36)
where Au = (L2u−L2i )∆u is the area of the user region.
Proof: For the detailed proof, see [23].
Note that (36) makes use of the fact that users are homogeneously distributed in the user region
with the area Au, and the respective PDF of the user location is therefore rAu in polar coordinates.
Theorem 3: The CDF of the unordered effective channel gain of any Eve for the scenario
presented in Section II is given as
FE(y) =
∫ θ+∆e
θ−∆e
∫ Le
Li
(
1−e
(
−yPL
(√
r2+h2
)
FM (θ,θk)
))
r
Ae − Ap I(θ, r) dr dθ, (37)
where Ae = (L2e −L2i ) ∆e2 −Au is the area of the Eve region, Ap is the area of the protected zone
given in (3a)-(3c), and I(θ, r) is the indicator function given as
I(r, θ) =
1, if (θ, r) ∈ SEP,0, otherwise, (38)
with SEP being the set of all angle-distance pairs within the Eve region after the protected zone
of interest is subtracted, which we refer to as unprotected-Eve region.
Proof: See Appendix C.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results based on extensive Monte Carlo simulations
to evaluate the secrecy performance of the hybrid NOMA/SUT transmission strategy under
17
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
User-region range, [Li, Lu] [5, 50] m
User-region (half) angle, ∆u 2.5◦
User density, λu 1
Eve density, λe 0.1
Number of BS antennas, M 100
Maximum antenna gain at BS 8 dBi
Thermal noise power, TNP −174 dBm/Hz
Transmission bandwidth, BW 100 MHz
Noise figure, NF 9 dB
Frequency, fc 28 GHz
Target secrecy rates, {Ri,Rj} {1, 4}BPCU
Power allocation ratios, {β2i , β2j } {0.75, 0.25}
UAV-BS operation altitude, h {20, 50}m
consideration. We numerically verify the analytical expressions derived in Section IV, as well,
which are shown to have a very good match with the simulation data. We consider the mmWave
PL model adopted by 3GPP urban micro (UMi) environment given as [24]
PL(x, fc) = 32.4 + 21 log10(x) + 20 log10(fc),
where x is the LoS distance, and fc is the carrier frequency (normalized by 1 GHz). The noise
power is given as N0 =TNP+ 10 log10(BW) +NF, where TNP is the thermal noise power, BW
is the transmission bandwidth, and NF is the noise figure at the receive end. In order to have
sufficiently distinct strong and weak users in the power domain, we choose the NOMA user
indices as i= 10 and j= 1. The complete list of simulation parameters are given in Table I.
In Fig. 3, we depict the sum secrecy rate along with varying protected zone shape (through
(∆p, Lp) pairs) for the area fraction of q ∈ [0.01, 0.13]. In particular, we assume the expansion
ratio of κ= 2 (i.e., ∆e = 2∆u, Le = 2Lu), UAV-BS altitude of h= 20 m, transmit power of
Ptx = 45 dBm, and worst-case Eve decoding. We observe that the secrecy performance of the
hybrid NOMA/SUT scheme is superior to that of OMA, and is generally better for protected
zone shapes having relatively small ∆p and large Lp. This result implies that Feje´r kernel in
(10), which represents the impact of the angular offset on the effective channel gain of the
most detrimental Eve, is dominant over the path loss. The optimal protected zone, therefore,
18
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Fig. 3. Sum secrecy rate vs. protected zone shape (i.e., angle, radius) assuming worst-case Eve decoding, angle fraction of
q ∈ [0.01, 0.13], altitude of h= 20 m, expansion ratio of κ= 2 (i.e., ∆e = 2∆u, Le = 2Lu), and transmit power of Ptx = 45 dBm.
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takes a shape so as to mostly cover the subregions (of the Eve region) with small angle-offset
values (i.e., Type-I in Fig. 2), for which the effective channel gain of the Eves would be large.
The sub-6GHz propagation, on the contrary, would require the subregions with small distance
values to be protected (e.g., Type-II) from the presence of Eves since the underlying channel is
rich-scattering, and path loss is hence the only feature to impact the average channel quality.
We also observe in Fig. 3 that the sum secrecy rate of the hybrid NOMA/SUT scheme is
maximized for particular choices of (∆p, Lp) pairs, or, equivalently, protected zone shapes, for
each q value (i.e., fixed protected zone area). Note that the optimal ∆p (i.e., ∆optp ) is greater than
its minimum possible value ∆minp for q ∈{0.01, 0.03, 0.05}, thereby representing a compromise
between protecting angle- versus distance-dimension (i.e., small ∆p vs. small Lp). For this range
of q values, we have enough degrees of freedom in choosing (∆p, Lp) pairs while maximizing
the secrecy sum rate (i.e., seeking for the optimal protected zone shape). The respective secrecy
performance is therefore referred to as shape-limited such that ∆minp <∆
opt
p <∆e, as discussed
in Remark 2.
On the other hand, as we desire to protect larger portion of the Eve region through greater
area fraction of q ∈{0.09, 0.13}, ∆optp becomes equal to ∆minp . In this situation, the requested
relatively-larger protected zone can only be constructed for a limited range of (∆p, Lp) values,
and corresponding ∆minp is larger accordingly as compared to those of small q values. In this
case, the optimal angular width of the protected zone is limited by ∆minp (i.e., ∆
opt
p = ∆
min
p ). The
respective secrecy performance is therefore referred to as space-limited in the sense that the Eve
region is not sufficiently large any more as compared to the protected zone, which therefore
loses the flexibility in choosing (∆p, Lp) pairs to maximize secrecy rates.
In Fig. 4, we provide the sum secrecy rate results for a larger Eve region with the expansion
ratio of κ= 3 keeping all the other simulation parameters of Fig. 3 the same. We observe that
the respective characteristic of the secrecy-rate performance is similar to that of Fig. 3. In order
to better investigate the impact of larger κ on the optimization of the protected zone shape, we
focus on the space-limited secrecy performance associated with q= 0.09 in Fig. 3, for which
the best sum secrecy rate for the hybrid NOMA/SUT scheme is achieved when ∆optp = ∆
min
p .
Note that we need to consider q≈ 0.025 for κ= 3 to have the same protected zone area (in
size), which can be reasonably well approximated by q= 0.03 in Fig. 4. We observe that the
optimal secrecy performance of q= 0.03 (κ= 3) for the hybrid NOMA/SUT scheme is obtained
when ∆optp >∆
min
p , and the respective secrecy performance turns out to be shape-limited, as
20
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Fig. 4. Sum secrecy rate vs. protected zone angle assuming worst-case Eve decoding, angle fraction of q ∈ [0.01, 0.09], altitude
of h= 20 m, expansion ratio of κ= 3 (i.e., ∆e = 3∆u, Le = 3Lu), and transmit power of Ptx = 45 dBm.
discussed in Remark 2. More specifically, choosing ∆p optimally ends up with a sum secrecy
rate which is roughly 22% better than that for ∆minp in this setting. We therefore conclude that
although ∆minp might be considered as a heuristic choice for ∆
opt
p in mmWave communications
(aiming at protecting mostly the angle dimension), larger Eve regions (i.e., bigger κ) provide
better flexibility in optimizing the shape of the protected zone which ends up with ∆optp >∆
min
p .
We investigate the secrecy-rate convergence for varying area fraction q in Fig. 5 keeping all
the other simulation parameters of Fig. 4 the same. We observe that the difference of sum secrecy
rates between ∆optp = ∆
min
p and ∆
opt
p >∆
min
p diminishes for the hybrid NOMA/SUT scheme as q
increases, thereby shifting the secrecy-rate performance from shape-limited to space-limited. In
other words, seeking for an optimal ∆p loses its importance along with larger protected zone
areas since ∆optp = ∆
min
p turns out to be already fair enough (since the protected zone cannot take
any shape due to the available space in the Eve region being limited). We furthermore observe
that the sum secrecy of the hybrid scheme rate saturates around 4 bits per channel use (BPCU)
after q= 0.1, which implies that allocating additional resources on the ground to protect more
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Fig. 5. Sum secrecy rate vs. angle fraction assuming worst-case Eve decoding, altitude of h= 20 m, expansion ratio of κ= 3
(i.e., ∆e = 3∆u, Le = 3Lu), and transmit power of Ptx = 45 dBm.
area within the Eve region is not necessary.
In Fig. 6, we depict the secrecy-rate performance for varying transmit power of Ptx ∈ [−15, 45]
dBm while keeping all the other simulation parameters of Fig. 4 the same. In particular, we
consider area fraction values of q= 0.05 and q= 0.2 which correspond to shape- and space-
limited secrecy performance, respectively, as can be identified in Fig. 5. We observe in Fig. 6(a)
that the sum secrecy rates saturate roughly after Ptx = 5 dBm for the hybrid NOMA/SUT scheme
with either q value and ∆p ∈
{
∆optp ,∆
min
p
}
. As depicted in Fig. 6(b), the weak user is always in
outage for the transmit power larger than Ptx = 5 dBm, which is the reason for the maximum value
of the sum secrecy rate after saturation being at most the target secrecy rate of the strong user
(i.e., Rj = 4 BPCU). Note that the SINR expressions in (9) and (11) (associated with decoding
the weak user message) converge to the same ratio of β2i and β
2
j at high transmit power regime
(i.e., N0/Ptx→ 0). As a result, weak user cannot achieve any positive secrecy rate at high Ptx,
and is always in outage since the respective nonzero target secrecy rate cannot be met.
On the other hand, Fig. 6(a) depicts also that the sum secrecy rate makes a peak at Ptx =−1.5
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Fig. 6. Sum secrecy rate vs. transmit power assuming worst-case Eve decoding, angle fraction of q ∈{0.05, 0.2}, altitude of
h= 20 m, expansion ratio of κ= 3 (i.e., ∆e = 3∆u, Le = 3Lu).
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Fig. 7. Sum secrecy rate vs. protected zone angle assuming worst-case Eve decoding, angle fraction of q ∈ [0.01, 0.11], altitude
of h= 50 m, expansion ratio of κ= 3 (i.e., ∆e = 3∆u, Le = 3Lu), and transmit power of Ptx = 45 dBm.
dBm for q= 0.2, thereby exceeding the strong user target secrecy rate of Rj = 4 BPCU. Note that
the SINR expressions in (9) and (11) do not converge to the same ratio of the power allocation
coefficients in this transmit power regime, but rather remains as a function of the effective channel
gains. Since the weak user has a sufficiently better channel quality than the most detrimental
Eve for q= 0.2, its target secrecy rate is likely to be met with a nonzero probability, which
results in an increase (i.e., peak) in the sum secrecy rates. Note that the effective channel gain
of the weak user is not sufficiently better than that of the most detrimental Eve for q= 0.05
since the subregions that are likely to have the most detrimental Eve is not covered enough by
the protected zone (due to small q). The weak user therefore cannot have as satisfactory outage
performance as for q= 0.2, as depicted in Fig. 6(b). As a final remark, we note that the sum
secrecy rate of q= 0.05 with ∆optp is superior to that with ∆
min
p for all transmit power levels.
We investigate the impact of UAV-BS operation altitude by considering h= 50 m, and produce
the respective sum secrecy rate results in Fig. 7 keeping all the other simulation parameters of
Fig. 4 the same. We observe that the sum secrecy rates deteriorate along with increasing altitude
for the same area fraction q, as expected. Note that the effective channel gains of the NOMA
users degrade with increasing altitude, thereby requiring larger protected zone to achieve the
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Fig. 8. Sum secrecy rate vs. transmit power assuming worst-case Eve decoding, angle fraction of q ∈{0.05, 0.2}, altitude of
h= 50 m, expansion ratio of κ= 3 (i.e., ∆e = 3∆u, Le = 3Lu).
same secrecy rate performance. We also observe that the respective sum secrecy rates deteriorate
rapidly as ∆p gets away from its optimal value, for which the corresponding decay characteristic
at low altitude of h= 20 m is relatively slower, as presented in Fig. 4. We therefore conclude
that the penalty associated with employing non-optimal protected zone shape (i.e., non-optimal
∆p) becomes more significant along with increasing altitude.
We also present the secrecy-rate performance for h= 50 m along with varying transmit power
in Fig. 8 assuming q= {0.05, 0.2} and keeping all the other simulation parameters the same.
We observe that the sum secrecy rates follow a very similar variation characteristic along with
increasing transmit power as compared to those for h= 20 m depicted in Fig. 6(a). In particular,
the sum secrecy rate for the hybrid NOMA/SUT scheme with q= 0.2 does not exceed the target
secrecy rate of the strong user (i.e, 4 BPCU) for any transmit power. This result implies that
the weak user cannot produce enough secrecy rate to meet its target secrecy rate at h= 50 m (as
opposed to the corresponding low-altitude results in Fig. 6(a)). We also note that the secrecy-rate
performance superiority of the hybrid NOMA/SUT schemes over OMA for this relatively higher
altitude is much greater than the one for lower altitude of h= 20 m in Fig. 6(a).
We finally consider the impact of the decoding capability of the most detrimental Eve by taking
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Fig. 9. Sum secrecy rate vs. transmit power of hybrid NOMA/SUT scheme for worst- and best-case Eve decoding, assuming
angle fraction of q ∈{0.05, 0.2}, expansion ratio of κ= 3 (i.e., ∆e = 3∆u, Le = 3Lu).
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into account the best-case condition, which assumes no multiuser decoding (i.e., no SIC) at the
Eve side, as discussed in Section III-B. In particular, we depict the secrecy-rate performance of
the hybrid NOMA/SUT scheme in Fig. 9 along with varying transmit power for worst- and best-
case conditions at h= {20, 50}m while keeping all the other simulation parameters of Fig. 4 the
same. We observe that the sum secrecy rate of q= 0.05 catches that of q= 0.2 for the best-case
condition, and saturates roughly for Ptx≥ 5 dBm irrespective of the UAV-BS altitude, as discussed
in Remark 3. This result implies that as the most detrimental Eve loses its multiuser decoding
capability (due to lack of information on decoding order or power allocation of the legitimate
users, or error propagation in SIC), we do not need to have large protected zones (i.e., large q).
We also infer from the peak associated with q= 0.2 around Ptx = 3 dBm in Fig. 9(b) that the
weak NOMA user can meet its target secrecy rate for the best-case condition at h= 50 m, which
never happens for the worst-case condition. We also note the huge improvement of 3 BPCU in
steady-state secrecy-rate performance as a result of the best-case condition (as compared to the
worst-case condition).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we consider the sum-secrecy performance of NOMA-based transmission in a
UAV-assisted mmWave network. The secrecy rates are improved through carefully designing
protected zone outside the user region, which is cleared from the presence of any malicious
receiver. We show that the optimal shape of the protected zone reflects a compromise between
protecting angle and distance dimension, thanks to the mmWave propagation characteristics. We
also show that the scenario-dependent practical values of protected zone area and transmit power
are sufficient for the proposed strategy to achieve desired secrecy rates.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this appendix, we derive the outage probability expressions for the strong NOMA and
SUT users, in sequence, provided in Theorem 1. To derive the secrecy outage probability for
the strong NOMA user (i.e., j-th one), we elaborate (27) considering the worst- and best-case
conditions for the decoding capability of Eves separately. Employing the SINR expressions of
27
(9) and (11), and rate expressions of (15) and (16), the desired secrecy outage probability in
(27) for the worst-case condition is given as
Poj|Φ = Pr
{
log
(
1 +
Ptx
N0
|hHj w|2β2j
)
≤ log
(
1 +
Ptx
N0
gEβ
2
j
)
+ Rj | Φ
}
, (39)
= Pr
{
|hHj w|2 ≤
2Rj−1
Ptx
N0
β2j
+ 2RjgE | Φ
}
. (40)
Employing the PDF of the j-th user effective channel gain and that of the most detrimental Eve,
(40) can be computed using (29) with the help of (30a).
For the best-case condition of decoding strong NOMA user, we employ the respective SINR
expression in (12), and follow the same strategy of the worst-case condition which yields
Poj|Φ = Pr
{
log
(
1 +
Ptx
N0
|hHj w|2β2j
)
≤ log
(
1 +
Ptx gEβ
2
j
Ptx gEβ2i +N0
)
+ Rj | Φ
}
, (41)
= Pr
{
|hHj w|2 <
2Rj−1
Ptx
N0
β2j
+ 2Rj
gE
1 + Ptx
N0
gEβ2i
| Φ
}
, (42)
which can be computed similarly by (29) and (30b).
We finally consider the outage probability of the SUT user, which is very similar to that
of the strong NOMA user. In particular, considering the SINR expressions of (9) and (11) (or
equivalently (12)) for single user only, and rate expressions of (15) and (16), we express the
outage probability in (28) as follows
Poj|Φ = Pr
{
log
(
1 +
Ptx
N0
|hHj w|2
)
≤ log
(
1 +
Ptx
N0
gE
)
+ Rj | Φ
}
, (43)
= Pr
{
|hHj w|2 ≤
2Rj−1
Ptx
N0
+ 2RjgE | Φ
}
, (44)
which can be calculated similarly by (29) along with the upper limit. where δmaxj (y) =
2Rj−1
Ptx
N0
+2Rjy.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this appendix, we derive the outage probability expression for the weak NOMA user (i.e.,
i-th one) given in Theorem 2. We follow the same strategy of the outage probability derivation
for the strong user while carrying out the desired derivation. Note that the SINR expressions in
(11) and (12) corresponding to the worst- and best-case conditions become equal for the weak
user. This observation is because of the fact that the weak user always decodes its own message
in the presence of the strong user’s message, and, therefore, does not apply SIC.
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The desired outage probability for both the worst- and best-case condition is given as
Poi|Φ = Pr
{
log
(
1 +
Ptx|hHi w|2β2i
Ptx|hHi w|2β2j +N0
)
≤ log
(
1 +
PtxgEβ
2
i
PtxgEβ2j +N0
)
+ Ri | Φ
}
, (45)
= Pr
{
ε1 |hHi w|2 < ε2 | Φ
}
, (46)
where
ε1 =
Ptx
N0
(
(1 +
Ptx
N0
β2j gE)− 2Riβ2j (1 +
Ptx
N0
gE)
)
, (47)
ε2 = 2
Ri(1 +
Ptx
N0
gE)− (1 + Ptx
N0
β2j gE). (48)
Based on ε1 in (47) being negative or positive, the desired outage probability in (46) is further
elaborated as follows
Poi|Φ =
Pr
{|hHi w|2 < ε2/ε1 | Φ} , ε1 > 0, (49a)
Pr
{|hHi w|2 > ε2/ε1 | Φ} , ε1 < 0, (49b)
where ε1 > 0 is equivalent to
gE < % =
1− 2Riβ2j
Ptx
N0
β2j
. (50)
The desired outage probability can then be computed using (31) by the help of (32) and (33).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this appendix, we derive the unordered CDF of Eves after the protected zone of either
type specified in Section II-C is subtracted from the original Eve region, which is referred to as
unprotected-Eve region. The desired CDF is defined for an arbitrary Eve with the index k as
FE(z) = Pr
{|gHkw|2 ≤ z} =∫ θ+∆e
θ−∆e
∫ Le
Li
Pr
{|gHkw|2 ≤ z | θk = θ, dk = r} fEP(θ, r) dr dθ, (51)
where fEP(θ, r) is the PDF of the location (i.e., joint angle-distance) distribution for Eves in the
unprotected-Eve region. Note that fEP(θ, r) is seemingly a function of the specific shape of the
protected zone, and, hence, depends on particular choice of (∆p, Lp). Considering the effective
channel gain definition of (10), the CDF in (51) can be further elaborated as follows
FE(z) =
∫ θ+∆e
θ−∆e
∫ Le
Li
Pr
{
|αk|2
PL
(√
r2 + h2
)FM (θ, θk) ≤ z} fEP(θ, r) dr dθ. (52)
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Recalling that |αk|2 is exponentially distributed due to the definition of small-scale fading αk
being complex Gaussian, the desired CDF in (52) becomes [23]
FE(z) =
∫ θ+∆e
θ−∆e
∫ Le
Li
(
1−e
(
−zPL
(√
r2+h2
)
FM (θ,θk)
))
fEP(θ, r) dr dθ. (53)
Considering an arbitrary angular sector within the unprotected-Eve region of Fig. 2 with a
constant minimum radius of L and angular width of ∆, the distance and angle of Eves are
statistically independent with the marginal PDF of the distance given as [23]
fd(r) =
2r
L2e − L2
. (54)
Since the angle is uniformly distributed, the conditional PDF of the location is given as
fEP(θ, r|SA) = 2r
L2e − L2
× 1
∆
=
r
A
, (55)
where SA stands for the set of all angle-distance pairs within the specified angular sector, and
A is the respective area (of the angular sector). The unconditional PDF of the location can be
obtained using (55) as follows
fEP(θ, r) =
∫
SA
fEP(θ, r|SA = y) fSA(y) dy (56)
=
∫
SA
r
A
× A
Ae − Ap dy =
r
Ae − Ap , (57)
which uses the fact that any angle-distance pair is present in the unprotected-Eve region with the
probability of A
AEP
, thanks to the assumption of Eve deployment being homogeneous. Note also
that fEP(θ, r) takes nonzero values only when the angle-distance pair is in the unprotected-Eve
region, i.e., (θ, r)∈SEP. Since the integration in (53) considers also the angle-distance pairs such
that (θ, r) 6∈ SEP, we describe the possible (θ, r) pairs by the indicator function in (38), which
readily yields (37) using (53) and (57).
REFERENCES
[1] Cisco. (2019, Jun.) Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Trends, 2017–2022. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni
[2] L. Zhu, Z. Xiao, X. Xia, and D. Oliver Wu, “Millimeter-wave communications with non-orthogonal multiple access for
B5G/6G,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 116 123–116 132, Aug. 2019.
[3] B. Li, Z. Fei, and Y. Zhang, “UAV communications for 5G and beyond: Recent advances and future trends,” IEEE Internet
Things J., vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 2241–2263, Apr. 2019.
[4] J. M. Hamamreh, H. M. Furqan, and H. Arslan, “Classifications and applications of physical layer security techniques for
confidentiality: A comprehensive survey,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 1773–1828, 2nd Quar. 2019.
30
[5] N. Romero-Zurita, D. McLernon, M. Ghogho, and A. Swami, “PHY layer security based on protected zone and artificial
noise,” IEEE Sig. Process. Lett., vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 487–490, May 2013.
[6] S. H. Chae, W. Choi, J. H. Lee, and T. Q. S. Quek, “Enhanced secrecy in stochastic wireless networks: Artificial noise
with secrecy protected zone,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 9, no. 10, pp. 1617–1628, Oct. 2014.
[7] W. Liu, Z. Ding, T. Ratnarajah, and J. Xue, “On ergodic secrecy capacity of random wireless networks with protected
zones,” IEEE Trans. Vehic. Technol., vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 6146–6158, Aug. 2016.
[8] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 6, pp.
2180–2189, Jun. 2008.
[9] X. Sun, W. Yang, Y. Cai, Z. Xiang, and X. Tang, “Secure transmissions in millimeter wave SWIPT UAV-based relay
networks,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 785–788, Jun. 2019.
[10] X. Sun, W. Yang, Y. Cai, R. Ma, and L. Tao, “Physical layer security in millimeter wave SWIPT UAV-based relay
networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 35 851–35 862, Mar. 2019.
[11] X. Sun, W. Yang, and Y. Cai, “Secure communication in NOMA assisted millimeter wave SWIPT UAV networks,” IEEE
Internet of Things Journal, 2019, early Access.
[12] N. Rupasinghe, Y. Yapıcı, I. Gu¨venc¸, H. Dai, and A. Bhuyan, “Enhancing physical layer security for NOMA transmission
in mmWave drone networks,” in Proc. Asilomar Conf. Signals, Syst., and Comput., Pacific Grove, California, Oct. 2018,
pp. 729–733.
[13] Z. Ding, P. Fan, and H. V. Poor, “Random beamforming in millimeter-wave NOMA networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp.
7667–7681, Feb. 2017.
[14] Y. Liu, Z. Qin, M. Elkashlan, Y. Gao, and L. Hanzo, “Enhancing the physical layer security of non-orthogonal multiple
access in large-scale networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1656–1672, Mar. 2017.
[15] Y. Zhang, H. Wang, Q. Yang, and Z. Ding, “Secrecy sum rate maximization in non-orthogonal multiple access,” IEEE
Commun. Lett., vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 930–933, May 2016.
[16] Y. Feng, S. Yan, Z. Yang, N. Yang, and J. Yuan, “Beamforming design and power allocation for secure transmission with
NOMA,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 2639–2651, May 2019.
[17] B. He, A. Liu, N. Yang, and V. K. N. Lau, “On the design of secure non-orthogonal multiple access systems,” IEEE J.
Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 35, no. 10, pp. 2196–2206, Oct. 2017.
[18] M. Tian, Q. Zhang, S. Zhao, Q. Li, and J. Qin, “Secrecy sum rate optimization for downlink MIMO nonorthogonal multiple
access systems,” IEEE Signal Process. Lett., vol. 24, no. 8, pp. 1113–1117, Aug. 2017.
[19] N. Zhao, D. Li, M. Liu, Y. Cao, Y. Chen, Z. Ding, and X. Wang, “Secure transmission via joint precoding optimization
for downlink MISO NOMA,” IEEE Trans. Vehic. Technol., vol. 68, no. 8, pp. 7603–7615, Aug. 2019.
[20] X. Chen, Z. Zhang, C. Zhong, D. W. K. Ng, and R. Jia, “Exploiting inter-user interference for secure massive non-orthogonal
multiple access,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 788–801, Apr. 2018.
[21] H. Wang, X. Zhang, Q. Yang, and T. A. Tsiftsis, “Secure users oriented downlink MISO NOMA,” IEEE J. Sel. Topics
Signal Process., vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 671–684, Jun. 2019.
[22] H. A. David and H. N. Nagaraja, Order Statistics. Willey, New York, Nf, USA, 2003.
[23] N. Rupasinghe, Y. Yapıcı, I. Gu¨venc¸, M. Ghosh, and Y. Kakishima, “Angular feedback for mmWave NOMA drone
networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Topics Signal Process., vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 628–643, Jun. 2019.
[24] 3GPP TR38.901, “Study on channel model for frequencies from 0.5 to 100 GHz (Release 16),” 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP), Tech. Rep., Oct. 2019.
